Inferential Focus has successfully forged a multidisciplinary method for detecting change in social, economic, political and technological environments. Our research product is developed using four steps of discovery which move from observation and data synthesis to the creation of intelligence and context for a change. Our Discovery Process employs both the analytic and creative components of observing events and inferring their meaning. The result is the detection of new situations and dynamics, 12 to 24 months ahead of general recognition.

Go to Discovery Process to understand Inference Reading™ and the steps of our research process.

Intelligence is the critical ingredient in strategic planning for any corporation. As a service dedicated to giving clients the focused intelligence they need to make important decisions, we consider the process of intelligence gathering and analysis to be of primary importance to our clients. Occasionally, we produce client Briefings and special Briefings on the process of intelligence gathering and guided decision-making. The following Briefings provide our insights into common flaws in the gathering and assessment of intelligence and offer the new best practices for making well-informed choices:

Release Date: April 26, 2004

Synopsis:  Intelligence moves through an organization in three separate steps: acquisition, delivery and acceptance. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, popularly known as the 9/11 commission, found many shortcomings in the first two stages of American intelligence as related to events leading to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Although the commission did not look closely at the third part-hearing an accepting intelligence-it could have found much to disturb it there as well.

Sometimes, the receiver of intelligence is simply not ready to hear what is being presented, especially when the new intelligence contradicts strongly held views and perspectives. We have noticed five traits, or behaviors, that can hinder a listener from actually hearing unanticipated intelligence: (1) certainty about already held positions; (2) focus on one activity or project to such an extent that new information is an interruption; (3) an overload of information; (4) an organizational hierarchy that blocks, alters or amends the intelligence being acquired; and (5) believing in a continuity or linearity of behavior. Overcoming these hindrances requires an open mind and an open system, both easier said than done.

Release Date: April 30, 2001

Synopsis: Like the moose of the Yellowstone-basin, who have recently been slaughtered by predators that unexpectedly returned to the area, forecasters and analysts of all types have had zero visibility of unexpected negative changes in this, the era of error. In the absence of predators, the Yellowstone moose allowed their survival skills and senses to atrophy. Like the moose, these forecasters and analysts made the critical mistake of assuming the future would be like the past, leaving themselves unprepared for an unexpected change. But unlike those who use data driven models to make inaccurate projections and predictions in the business world, the Yellowstone moose have quickly adapted to the new dynamic of predators in their area and are on the alert for signs of wolves or bears which may threaten them. Businesses would benefit by adopting the strategy of the moose, which relies on interdependence and constant, ongoing observation. These tactics, combined with new strategy and an assessment of more diverse observations (as opposed to relying solely on data driven models) will help guide businesses through the era of error.

Release Date: August 16, 1999

Synopsis: Leaders at many levels have recently taken some actions that indicated they are losing control or, more particularly, are worried that their followers might think they are losing control. But these actions only offer additional proof that leaders can no longer manage the outcomes they seek because responses from nominal followers are becoming less conducive to their mustering forces and completing projects.

Many leaders have sensed this change and have engaged anthropologists, scenario writers and other specialists to help them solve the problems. We suggest that a look at some changes in the medical profession could be more insightful. Specifically, the actions of a few sensitive doctors demonstrate that, at minimum, leaders need to recognize three things: (1) no methodology or research technique can replace direct, ongoing contact (personal observations); (2) no approach can replace or overcome the need to see the patient/client/customer/employee as a fully rounded person and not a slot in a segmentation or specialization chart (personal context); and (3) controlling authority figures no longer produce the most satisfactory outcomes or results (let go).

Release Date: June 30, 1998

Synopsis: A closer look at the CIA’s mistakes concerning India’s nuclear plan suggest that the American agency was organized to fail. A study of its processes revealed that structural inadequacies made it impossible for the agency to anticipate Indian behavior. Those same inadequacies can seep into any organization’s intelligence and information systems.

Looking at several recent corporate actions, we can see that similar types of mistakes are taking place in the private sector as well. Seeking to learn from the CIA’s mistakes, we developed a set of objectives that can help the typical CEO avoid the pitfalls that undermined the CIA’s effectiveness: (1) Place personal observations at the core of information-gathering systems; (2) avoid information addiction; (3) structure time to think and reflect (i.e., to focus) on what is being learned; (4) develop a context (i.e., an understanding) of what is taking place and use that context to guide decisions; and (5) look for discontinuities (i.e., do not assume continuity).

Release Date: February 3, 1997

Synopsis: The numbers are wrong! After all these years and after so many important decisions, business and political leaders are learning that the numbers used to make those decisions were incorrect or not appropriate. The inference from these admissions is that the experts and number crunchers have finally admitted that the world has changed significantly and that their measures were more appropriate for the old world.

Business leaders are also beginning to admit that to change the numbers they have to change their market approach. Price reductions, cost-cutting measures and increased advertising budgets that have produced desire numbers in the past are no longer doing so.

Over the past six years, we have watched individuals make subtle changes in their behavior to respond to large economic and social pressures. When those smaller changes did not produce the desired results, individuals reached their turning points and initiated a serious personal reassessment process that led to major behavioral changes in the marketplace as well as the voting booth.

Now, some business leaders are reaching the realization that small incremental actions are not sufficient to generate the numbers they desire. In essence, we see institutions and their leaders creeping closer to their turning points, the place where they will strategically restructure their business.